2026 Winning Essay - "Stop and search in schools and youth spaces"
Congratulations to Maya Maimaris, from the Henrietta Barnett School on achieving first place on the 2026 Justice Pathways Programme 'Justice Brief' Competition!
Prompt: "Police sometimes use stop-and-search powers around schools, parks, and transport hubs. Explain what the law says about when stop and search is allowed, and discuss whether its use around young people is fair and proportionate. Suggest one change that could reduce harm while still allowing police to prevent crime."
‘Stop-and-search’ is one of the most controversial police powers in the United Kingdom, particularly when used around schools, parks, transport hubs and other spaces predominantly populated by young people. The central legal question is whether the state’s power to stop and search is exercised in a way that is lawful, fair and proportionate when directed at children and teenagers. Around youth spaces, stop and search forces us to confront the tension between personal privacy and the presence of law enforcement in everyday life. At the heart of the debate lies a tension between effective crime prevention and the protection of young people’s rights. The core issue is whether the legal framework sufficiently protects young people from unnecessary, inappropriate or discriminatory interference while still allowing police to prevent violence.
The principal laws governing stop and search are contained in section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)¹. This provision permits a police officer to stop and search an individual in a public place where the officer has “reasonable grounds for suspicion” that the person is carrying stolen or prohibited items, such as weapons or drugs. Reasonable suspicion is intended to protect citizens from arbitrary interference. Officers must explain the reason for the search and provide identifying information confirming their police status. PACE Code A¹ further requires officers to record grounds for suspicion and prohibits reliance on personal characteristics such as race, age or appearance. Section 1 therefore attempts to balance personal privacy with effective policing.
Police also have broader powers under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994². Where a senior officer reasonably believes serious violence may occur, stop and search may be authorised without individualised suspicion for a limited period. These suspicionless powers raise safeguarding concerns that contrast with PACE’s privacy protections. Section 60 can assist police in responding quickly to threats such as knife crime, but the absence of provable suspicion is concerning when applied in spaces used by minors, increasing the risk of unnecessary searches.
All stop and search powers must comply with the Human Rights Act 1998³, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights⁴. Article 8 protects the right to respect for private life, and Article 14 prohibits discrimination. Being stopped and searched interferes with privacy, so any interference must be lawful, necessary, and justified. Disproportionate targeting of particular racial groups raises serious equality concerns, highlighting that legality alone is insufficient; powers must also be exercised fairly and proportionately.
Courts have recognised these risks. In ‘Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom’⁵, the European Court of Human Rights held that suspicionless stop and search powers under earlier terrorism legislation violated Article 8 due to insufficient safeguards and excessive discretion. Although the legislative context differed, this reasoning applies to contemporary section 60 powers, particularly in areas frequented by young people. Domestic case law has since recognised that suspicionless powers can be lawful with effective safeguards. In ‘R (Roberts) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis’⁶, the UK Supreme Court accepted that revised statutory codes could render stop and search compatible with Article 8, but this relied heavily on effective implementation and monitoring. Without meaningful safeguards, young people remain vulnerable.
Young people’s rights must also be considered under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)⁷, even though it is not fully incorporated into UK law. Article 3 requires the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration, while Article 16 protects against arbitrary interference with privacy.
When police conduct stop and search around schools or youth centres, they act directly in environments designed for children’s welfare. Spaces intended to protect young people should not become spaces where they feel permanently suspected.
The fairness of stop and search around young people must be assessed formally and critically. Formally, the law contains safeguards: reasonable suspicion under PACE¹, time-limited authorisations under section 60², and oversight through statutory codes. In practice, however, persistent racial disproportionality raises concerns about fairness. Black young people are stopped at significantly higher rates than their white peers. While disparity alone does not establish unlawful discrimination, it raises questions about how “reasonable suspicion” is interpreted and applied in practice.
Academic research supports these concerns. Criminologists Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips⁸ argue that disproportionate stop and search damages trust between police and communities, particularly among young people. Perceived unfairness undermines the legitimacy of law enforcement and reduces cooperation with crime prevention, showing that policing depends not only on powers but also on public confidence.
Developmental considerations further complicate the issue. Adolescents are not simply smaller adults. Being publicly stopped and searched can cause embarrassment, anxiety and long-term mistrust of authority. Repeated exposure reinforces perceptions of over-policing and injustice, particularly in socially disadvantaged communities. From a crime-prevention perspective, this may be counterproductive: if stop and search alienates young people, the long-term goal of reducing violence may be undermined.
At the same time, it would be overly simplistic to argue that stop and search should never occur in youth spaces. The state also has positive obligations to protect life. Under Article 2 of the European Convention⁴, authorities must take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable threats. In areas with serious youth violence, targeted stop and search may prevent weapons from being carried and avert fatal harm. The issue is therefore not simply legality, but legitimacy: policing powers must both prevent crime and maintain public trust.
The difficulty lies in ensuring that stop and search in youth spaces is intelligence-led and exceptional rather than routine. Suspicionless section 60 powers² are especially sensitive in this context. When young people are searched without individual suspicion near schools or youth centres, the symbolic message is powerful: spaces of learning and safety risk becoming spaces of surveillance and suspicion.
A proportionate reform would be to introduce a statutory child-specific safeguard whenever stop and search is conducted on a person under eighteen in or around schools and designated youth spaces. Officers should record a brief justification explaining why the search is necessary and proportionate in light of the child’s age and welfare. This justification should engage with the particular context of a minor rather than repeating generic suspicion. Data on under-18s should be published clearly to allow monitoring of racial and geographic disparities. These reforms would not remove police powers, but they would strengthen accountability and embed child-centred reasoning, aligning with the UNCRC⁷ principles.
In conclusion, stop and search around youth spaces engages fundamental principles of a rights-based legal system. While PACE¹, section 60², and the Human Rights Act³ provide safeguards, persistent disproportionality, developmental vulnerability, and the symbolic impact of policing in educational environments show that current practice does not fully reflect the best interests of the child. Ultimately, the legitimacy of stop and search will depend on whether the state exercises its powers with restraint, transparency, and genuine respect for the rights and dignity of the young people it seeks to protect.
References
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 1.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Section 60.
Human Rights Act 1998.
European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 2, 8, 14.
Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom (2010) 50 E.H.H.R. 45.
R (Roberts) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2015) UKSC 79.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, Articles 3, 16.
Bowling B and Phillips C, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stop and Search’ (2007), The Modern Law Review
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